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President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has run into unexpected difficulties with Congress in
obtaining quick approval for the constitutional reforms he needs to facilitate his economic and
social programs. Cardoso, who took office on Jan. 1, hoped to push the measures through Congress
without delay. However, political wrangling about an amnesty for congressional deputies and
controversial salary increases have slowed the process. Cardoso's Oct. 3 electoral victory was
attributed in large part to the success of the Plan Real, the anti-inflation economic adjustment plan
he designed while serving as finance minister under former president Itamar Franco (see NotiSur,
10/07/94).
Cardoso says his proposed reforms to the 1988 Constitution are essential to keep the Plan Real
on track and overhaul the federal bureaucracy, especially administration of cumbersome social
programs. The proposed changes include steps to increase taxes and improve collection, privatize
inefficient state enterprises, and enact measures to reduce deficit spending. Cardoso had hoped
to steer the reform package through Congress even before his inauguration, but that proved
impossible. As a result, when his administration took up the reins of government in January,
Cardoso made constitutional reform his top priority.
As soon as Cardoso took office, it became evident that his plan for swift passage of the reforms
would encounter obstacles. First, although Cardoso assumed office on Jan. 1, the old Congress did
not complete its term until Jan. 31, and the newly elected congressional delegates only took their
seats on Feb. 1, which delayed the introduction and discussion of the reform measures. Moreover,
Cardoso's impressive electoral victory in October did not translate into comparable support in
Congress, even though the coalition of his Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and
the five other parties aligned with it controls more than 60% of both houses of Congress. Some
opposition leaders have said that, despite the pro- government majority in Congress, significant
differences exist regarding details of the specific reforms.
In addition, opposition leaders in Congress and civic sectors including the influential Brazilian
National Bishops' Conference (CNBB)- -have called for ample debate on the proposed measures.
Bishop Luciano Mendes de Almeida, president of the CNBB, said on Dec. 29 that the bishops'
primary concern when Congress debates the proposed reforms is that the new government respond
to the demand for jobs and better salaries. "The government should urgently implement social
programs that provide a dignified life to the millions of Brazilians who are excluded from it," said
Mendes. The effort to win congressional approval of Cardoso's proposed reforms will be led by
Justice Minister Nelson Jobim and Vice President Marco Maciel. Jobim led an unsuccessful fight
to pass the same reforms in 1994. The administration will send the package of reforms to Congress
by Feb. 15. During the first week in February, the ministers will consult experts in various areas to
draw up the final draft of the bills that are to be sent to Congress in the middle of the month. Jobim
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said that the administration will concentrate on first passing the reforms that are directly related to
the economic plan, which Cardoso refers to as "modernizing the state," and postpone some of the
political measures until 1996. Meanwhile, the executive's relations with Congress have been plagued
with tensions almost since the day Carodoso took office, which complicates the perspective for rapid
passage of the reform package. In the first days of the new administration, for example, the Senate
failed in three successive sessions to unite the necessary quorum to vote on approval of Cardoso's
nominee for Central Bank president, Persio Arida.
Next, opposition legislators took advantage of the delay in approving Arida's nomination to
pressure pro-government representatives to pass an amnesty bill in favor of then Senate president
Humberto Lucena. Lucena was re-elected in October, even though he had been declared ineligible
to participate in elections by the electoral commission (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) because
he had used the congressional printing office to print 130,000 calendars for campaign advertising.
Lucena appealed the decision, ran despite the STF ruling, and was re-elected. However, the STF
denied his appeal and declared his victory invalid. On Jan. 17, Congress approved an amnesty
bill, allowing Lucena to take his seat in the new legislature on Feb. 1. However, the Public
Ministry said on Jan. 20 that it would file a motion with the Supreme Court to declare the amnesty
unconstitutional.
Although numerous other congressional delegates had also used the government printing office for
campaign material, Lucena was the only one charged. After passing the amnesty, the other deputies
scrambled to pay off their printing office bills, since the amnesty stipulated that any deputy or
senator who paid the amount in question before Feb. 1 could not be removed from office. In addition
to the controversy concerning Lucena, new legislation regarding salaries both for government
officials and in regard to the country's minimum wage laws also forced a major conflict with the
Cardoso administration. Immediately after the holiday recess, the outgoing Congress voted for
a hefty 100% salary increase for top government officials, bringing the salary for congressional
deputies to US$12,000 a month. If the raise stands, the executive will have to make substantial cuts in
the 1995 budget to compensate.
In addition, a 22% raise approved for public employees would require as much as US$16 billion
more in budget cuts. Congress also voted for a 30% raise in the monthly minimum wage (which will
benefit about 16 million workers) bringing it to US$120 a month, in what many observers saw as an
effort to offset the public outcry over the 100% raise that legislators had approved for themselves.
However, Cardoso has threatened to veto the minimum wage increase unless it is completely
separated from the payment of pensions and social security benefits. He justified this position,
saying 71% of pensioners receive their stipend based on the minimum wage and including them in
the proposed raise would cost an additional US$8 billion a year, possibly setting off an inflationary
spiral that could threaten the Plan Real.
Cardoso's opposition to the minimum wage generated angry protest demonstrations against the
president when he visited the Acari favela of Rio de Janeiro on Jan. 20, especially since Cardoso was
not as vehement in his opposition to the congressional decision to raise the salary of legislators and
civil servants. To alleviate tensions, however, Cardoso negotiated an agreement with congressional
deputies that commits legislators to voluntarily give up 25% of their newly approved salary hikes
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until it is possible to raise the minimum wage. (Sources: Knight-Ridder Financial Information,
01/04/95; Inter Press Service, 01/05/95, 01/18/95; Agence France-Presse, 12/26/94, 12/29/94, 01/02/95,
01/09-13/95, 01/17/95, 01/20/95, 01/22/95, 01/26/95; Reuter, 02/03/95)
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